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The primary objective of this paper is to evaluate alternative control strategies for a
number of simulated outbreaks of Foot-and-Mouth Disease (FMD) in four agriculturally
diverse Irish regions, examining for the first time, the potential role of emergency
vaccination in the country. The recent EU Directive (2003/85/EC) on FMD control
permits the use of emergency vaccination as part of an FMD control strategy. While the
slaughter of infected animals and “dangerous contacts” (susceptible animals on
epidemiologically linked holdings) remains the principal tool for tackling an outbreak,
the potential use of vaccination as an adjunct to the basic culling policy is now being
considered. Using an integrated approach, combining epidemiological and economic
modules, the alternatives of stamping-out both alone and in conjunction with emergency
vaccination are examined using hypothetical outbreaks and their control costs compared.
Overall, it cannot be said, a priori, that one control option is better than the other. Choice
of control strategy would appear to be highly dependent on herd density, production type
and other region specific issues. This analysis has focused on control costs only; taking
wider economy costs into account may however change this overall conclusion.
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“Epidemiology and economics are separate scientific areas but are very much complementary when the
goal is the efficient management of animal health.” (FAO-Food & Agricultural Organisation of the UN)
1. Introduction
FMD is one of the list A diseases (most infectious and economically damaging) of the
OIE (Office International des Epizooties - World Organisation for Animal Health).
Following the 2001 Irish outbreak, after a lapse of sixty years, the vulnerability of the
farm and non-farm economy to the threat of exotic livestock diseases was exposed.
There has been somestudy of the economic consequences of the outbreak;
1 however little
emphasis has been placed on an evaluation of control and eradication strategies. FMD is
a highly contagious livestock disease with significant repercussions for livestock
producers particularly in terms of productivity and trade effects, with many other sectors
also being negatively affected by the measures which must be taken to control an
outbreak. The disease has the ability to spread rapidly and survive under a variety of
conditions and its control and eradication is hindered by the many ways in which it can
be spread. Following the 2001 outbreak in various EU Member States, there was severe
criticism throughout Europe of the culling policy used to contain the virus in the Member
States affected and attention has turned towards the strategic use of emergency
vaccination in the event of future outbreaks.
This paper examines the potential use of emergency vaccination in an Irish context, as an
adjunct to the basic slaughter policy, and explores the cost-effectiveness of the alternative
control strategies of stamping-out (SO) alone and stamping-out in conjunction with
emergency vaccination (SOEV). The new emphasis placed on emergency vaccination as
a disease control measure has been assisted by amendments to the OIE rules in May
2002, on the time required to regain FMD free status after the use of vaccination. Any
decision in a country to employ emergency vaccination as part of a future control strategy
would have to take account of the impact such a campaign would have on the trading
environment. As in 2001, the basic disease control policy in the event of a future
outbreak in Ireland would be the slaughter of susceptible animals on infected premises
and those identified as dangerous contacts. In the Irish case it is envisaged that vaccinates
would subsequently be slaughtered as this would result in fewer trade implications than if
vaccinates were allowed enter the food chain. Once vaccinates are subsequently
slaughtered, countries are officially allowed back into markets three months after the
slaughter of the last animal. If vaccinates are not slaughtered market access is restricted
for a further three months.
2
The epidemiological model of disease spread used in the analysis is the North American
Animal Disease Spread Model (NAADSM). The computable general equilibrium (CGE)
model GTAP (Global Trade Analysis Project) is then used to assess the economic effects
1 O’Toole, Matthews & Mulvey (2001), OIE/FAO (2001), EU (2002), INDECON (2002)
2 Although official timeframes are in place, in reality it can often take countries longer to regain market
share.3
of the disease and its subsequent control strategies on both the agricultural sector and the
wider economy. The effects on trade and tourism are examined in particular.
There are two main parts to the paper. The following section examines the epidemiology
of the disease and the legislative background; a synopsis of the 2001 outbreak is also
given. Section 3 outlines how by combining the epidemiological and economic modules
contained in NAADSM, direct control costs are compared in an Irish context for a
number of hypothetical outbreaks. Regions of differing herd density, production type,
and location within the country were chosen for study to assess how well both control
strategies would operate in a number of diverse areas. A discussion of results then
follows.
2. Foot-and-Mouth Disease
FMD is, according to the classification of the OIE, the economically most important
infectious livestock disease, with very significant consequences for livestock producers,
related industries and consumers. It comes top of the list of all List A diseases which are
defined as:
“Transmissible diseases that have the potential for very serious and rapid spread,
irrespective of national borders, that are of serious socio-economic or public health
consequence and that are of major importance in the international trade of animals and
animal products.”
It is one of the most contagious of viral animal diseases and is caused by strains of one or
more of the seven distinct serotypes of FMD virus, genus Aphthovirus, family
Picornaviridae. The seven serotypes – O, A, Asia 1, C, SAT1, SAT2, and SAT3 – have
different geographical distributions and vaccines protective against strains in one
serotype will normally not protect against strains from different serotypes and may not
protect against different strains within the same serotype. There are also several subtypes
within each. The infections caused by different serotypes are clinically indistinguishable.
The disease predominantly affects cloven-hoofed animals, affecting almost all farmed
species, hence its economic significance. If not controlled, it generally causes very high
morbidity within herds without causing high mortality in adult animals; however, it can
cause significant mortalities in young lambs and piglets. It is characterised by fever and
the formation of painful vesicles (fluid-filled blisters) and erosions in the mouth, nose,
teats and feet. As a result, it causes serious production losses and welfare problems (Dept.
of Agriculture and Food, 2003:3).
The most important characteristics in the epidemiology of the disease include the rapid
spread of the virus, its stability under a variety of conditions and the occurrence of
serotypes (Donaldson, 1991:34). Cattle are important in the epidemiology of FMD
because of their high susceptibility to airborne virus, because they may excrete the virus
for at least four days before the first symptoms appear, and because of their overall
economic importance. Even though sheep and goats can also be infected, their symptoms4
are often less severe or are subclinical. Pigs are the most important source of air
dissemination of the virus; once infected, they excrete vast quantities of the virus. They
also have a high susceptibility to infection by the oral route (Donaldson and Doel,
1994:51). Thus pigs can be described as amplifying hosts and cattle as indicators. Sheep
can be described as maintenance hosts because they quite often have mild or even
inapparent signs that can easily be missed (Donaldson and Doel, 1994:35).
FMD is a difficult disease to control and eradicate because of the various mechanisms by
which the virus can be transmitted (Sellers, 1971). Several factors affect the spread of
the disease. The most important are the species infected, the number of direct and
indirect contacts among animals (mainly movement of animals and humans), animal
density in the area, husbandry methods, environmental conditions, and delays in
identifying the disease and applying control measures. The most common mechanism is
the movement of infected animals to susceptible animals (Donaldson et al., 2002:4). The
rate of spread within a herd depends on the stocking density. The primary methods of
FMD transmission are aerosol, direct contact and ingestion. Of all mechanisms of
transmission, movements of infected animals are by far the most important, followed by
movement of contaminated animal products. Once one or more animals in a herd have
been infected, the quantity of virus in the environment will be greatly amplified, and
transmission by different routes will be possible. The virus can be spread over long
distances by incubating or asymptomatic carrier animals; by vehicles such as feed trucks;
by birds, domestic animals, rodents and by fomites (inanimate communicators of
infection). Humans may inhale and harbour the virus in the respiratory tract for as long
as 24 hours, and may serve as a source of infection to animals (APHIS, 1991). Under
certain epidemiological and climatic conditions, FMD virus can be spread by the wind.
Of all mechanisms, spread by air is least controllable.
2.1 Legislative background
The advent of Denmark, Ireland and the UK to the European Community in 1973
foresaw considerable adjustments to the Intra-Community Trade Directive (64/432/EEC),
as these new Member States practised a non-vaccination policy for FMD.
3 This included
full stamping-out (SO) in the case of an outbreak, enabling them to retain their national
rules for protection against the disease. Other Member States continued their policy of
routine (annual) vaccination as before. The impossibility of continuing the differential
system of vaccination versus non-vaccination was immediately evident (Commission of
the European Communities, 1989:6). In 1985 the Council adopted Directive
(85/511/EEC) on the control of the disease throughout the Community and essential
common measures were laid down to deal with an outbreak in a uniform manner. With
the imminent completion of the single market, it was decided in 1989 that a cost-benefit
analysis of alternative control strategies for FMD be undertaken. On the evidence
provided by the report, a non-vaccination policy was found to be safer and cheaper.
More than a decade later the debate has turned to whether or not emergency vaccination
should be adopted in the event of future outbreaks.
3 Other Member States pursued a policy of annual (routine vaccination).5
This section describes the most recent FMD Directive (2003/85/EC), which made
important amendments to the incomplete measures of Directive (85/511/EEC). It allows
the EU to maintain its internationally recognised status of “free from FMD without
(routine) vaccination”. The basic approach of eradicating FMD by culling of Infected
Premises and known dangerous contacts is retained but greater prominence is given to the
role of emergency vaccination as a control option for use alongside stamping out in some
circumstances; providing for “suppressive” vaccination,
4 which generally means that the
vaccinated animals would subsequently be killed and “protective” vaccination
5 which
would allow the vaccinated animals to live out their normal economic lives. A brief
summary of the Directive follows (Department of Agriculture, 2004):
a) The new Directive puts forward emergency vaccination as an important means of
controlling an epidemic of animal disease and lays down conditions for the possible
marketing of meat from animals vaccinated on Union territory during an outbreak of
animal disease;
b) It extends the Community requirements as regards contingency plans and requires
Member States to review them every five years in the light of real-time alert exercises;
c) It gives five separate criteria,
6 any of which may be used as the basis for declaring an
outbreak of FMD on a holding; this should help to set preventive measures in motion
more quickly;
d) It requires the Member States to introduce systems of penalties to be applied in cases
of infringement of the national provisions adopted pursuant to Community directives;
e) It requires Member States to provide information about the dates on which the
Community measures were implemented. This should enable the Commission to
determine the extent to which Community reimbursement is due.
2.2 The 2001 outbreak
The speed, at which FMD of the Pan-Asia O type spread within the EU, particularly the
UK, in 2001, was unprecedented in the history of FMD, as was the scale of the outbreaks.
6.5m animals were slaughtered in the UK, 285,000 in the Netherlands, 63,000 in France
and 53,000 in Ireland. The presence of the disease was confirmed in the UK, France,
Ireland, and the Netherlands on the 21




4 Suppressive vaccination - emergency vaccination which is carried out exclusively in conjunction with a
stamping-out policy in a holding or area where there is an urgent need to reduce the amount of foot-and-
mouth disease virus circulating and to reduce the risk of it spreading beyond the perimeters of the holding
or the area and where the animals are intended to be destroyed following vaccination (Article 2).
5 Protective vaccination - emergency vaccination carried out on holdings in a designated area in order to
protect animals of susceptible species within this area against airborne spread or spread through fomites of
foot-and-mouth disease virus and where the animals are intended to be kept alive following vaccination
(Article 2).
6 See Appendix A6
respectively. The UK outbreak lasted 10 months, with 2,034 outbreaks of infection
extending to 10,124 farms and leading to the slaughter of some 4 million animals. In
addition, more than 2 million animals were slaughtered because of the welfare problems
that arose when they were confined to farms following movement restrictions. It was not
possible to contain the disease to the UK and it spread quickly to three other Member
States where more than 6.9m animals were slaughtered overall. An immediate ban was
imposed on the import of live susceptible species and of products of susceptible species
from these countries (unless appropriately treated).
Because the last Irish outbreak was confined to one case and stringent movement
restrictions were subsequently put in place, the 2001 outbreak was less serious than might
have been. The Indecon report on the single Irish outbreak found that it cost the
Exchequer € 107m but that had efforts to prevent further spread not been successful, the
adverse impact on Ireland’s GDP could have reached € 5.6 billion (a decrease of 6%),
with job losses of up to 12,000 and the potential devastation to 20 million susceptible
livestock (Indecon, 2002). Tourism was the main loser with losses estimated to be
€ 210m in the first six months of year. The Agri-Food sector actually benefited by around
€ 107m due to the impact of the UK outbreak, which resulted in higher than expected
export prices for livestock exports, particularly sheep meat with exporters benefiting from
the simultaneous and more severe outbreak in the UK. Indecon found that 75% of the
increase in the volume of pig exports to the UK that year was due to the outbreak, and
50% for sheep (Indecon, 2002:13). The beef sector was given a minor boost; however,
the on-going effects of BSE were felt. Overall, export values were found to be up from
the previous year by about € 63m in 2001 (Indecon, 2002:13). It is important to note that
another outbreak could potentially prove more serious; estimates suggest that in the best-
case scenario of a worldwide 3-month export ban, the reduction in food exports would be
equal to € 0.9bn. If non-EU markets imposed a longer 6-month ban, the overall cost
would amount to € 1.2bn (Indecon, 2002:16).
Table 1: Estimated gains (losses) as a result of the 2001 outbreak (Source: Indecon, 2002)
Estimated gains (losses) €million
Agriculture 107
Tourism and other sectors (210)
Exchequer costs (107)
Total (210)
Total as a % of GDP -0.2%
The European Court of Auditors report on the 2001 European outbreak found that
Member States were not adequately prepared for an outbreak and that the Commission
had not revised its response strategy in light of changes in risk factors. Member States
are therefore now required to update contingency plans, to undertake a cost-benefit7
analysis of alternative control strategies and to clarify the financial framework as applied
to epidemics of animal disease. In the event of future outbreak, the decision to be taken
on the appropriate control/ eradication measures to be put in place would not be an easy
one, but is one that would have to be taken and implemented quickly to ensure minimum
long-term damage. The potential economic impact of a future outbreak is difficult to
quantify, however a prompt control response policy is the most important defence against
potentially catastrophic spread. It is of huge importance that movement restrictions and
controls be put in place as soon as possible in the event of an outbreak, indeed the delay
in implementing these during the 2001 UK outbreak was found to double the overall cost
of the outbreak there. The total cost was estimated to be about £3.1 billion to the
agriculture and the food chain (including costs compensated by the exchequer) and a
further £2.7 to £3.2 billion to businesses directly affected by tourist expenditures
(Department for Food, Environment and Rural Affairs and the Department for Culture,
Media and Sport). The effects of an outbreak of that scale on the Irish economy and the
subsequent closure of markets would be devastating. The role which emergency
vaccination can play in an Irish context, in controlling an outbreak, alone or in
conjunction with culling therefore needs to be assessed on economic grounds.
3. The Epidemiological model - North American Animal Disease Spread Model
NAADSM is a stochastic state-transition model allowing for three mechanisms of disease
spread: infection by air (airborne), infection as a consequence of susceptibles coming
directly into contact with contagious animals (direct) and infection through indirect
means i.e., spread by farm vehicles, people etc. (indirect). The methodology is based on
a more elaborate form of the Reed-Frost algorithm.
7 It allows for additional transition
states and a spatial component, which the traditional theory does not. It is designed to
simulate the spread and control of foreign animal diseases in a population of susceptible
livestock herds and is the product of collaboration among academic and governmental
institutions in the United States and Canada (www.naadsm.org). It is a stochastic
simulation model, incorporating both epidemiologic and economic modules. The linking
of the two allows for tracking and comparing of costs of hypothetical FMD outbreaks and
related control strategies.
The model is herd-based with disease manifestation and transmission represented at herd
as opposed to individual animal level. Each herd (unit) has a production type (cattle,
sheep, pigs, etc.), size, location and disease state. The simulation proceeds in time steps
of one day. During each time step herds are affected by biological processes happening
in the animals (e.g., progress of the disease), the environment (e.g., airborne spread)
and/or human actions (e.g., vaccination). The “model” is the sum of these processes and
actions (Harvey et al. 2006:5 Appendix A). The model is stochastic, attempting to
imitate the random processes responsible for disease spread. Both spatial and temporal
aspects of the disease are simulated. Outputs of the epidemiological module are linked to
7 For further details, see Dillon (2007).8
an economic module that tracks various cost and price values – allowing for tracking and
comparing of costs of hypothetical outbreaks and related control strategies. It is based on
a previously designed stochastic state-transition model (Garner and Lack, 1995). Chance
occurrences such as spread of infection are simulated with Monte-Carlo methods to
maintain a stochastic basis (Schoenbaum et al, 2003).
Units move between the various states and probability functions characterise the duration
for which a herd remains in each state, this being determined stochastically. Five discrete
disease states are modelled in NAADSM i.e., susceptible, latent (incubating), infectious
subclinical, infectious clinical and immune. Time periods of these transition states are
modelled with triangular density functions. During the running of the model, herds shift
(make transitions) among these states. Spread of infection by direct and indirect contact
is based on simulated contact/movements among infected and susceptible herds.
Probabilities (input parameters) determine whether or not disease transmission occurs
from simulated contact among infected and susceptible herds. An illustration of the
differing states can be seen in figure 1 below:
Figure 1: States and transitions in the NAADSM model (Source NAADSM model description)
At the beginning of each replicate (simulation) one herd at the centre of the general circle
is said to be latent (incubating), all other herds are thought of as susceptible. Some
disease models (e.g., Garner and Lack, 1995) have previously used the Reed-Frost model
to model spread, however, this alone does not provide for the spatial spread of infection
as the algorithm assumes that each herd is equally likely to contact every other herd.
NAADSM bases spread on this plus risk, contact rates and other input parameters.9
Where possible Irish specific values were chosen to parameterise the model; although
where these were unavailable values were taken from the literature.
8 There are six basic
types of model input parameters: yes/no values, integer values, real numbers,





4) Disease detection and surveillance
5) Disease control
6) Direct costs
The model is flexible as regards the alteration of such parameters. The application of
NAADSM in Irish circumstances is investigated for four regions of varying
characteristics. It is undertaken for sheep and cattle herds in three regions and pigs are
taken into account in the fourth, Co. Cavan (where 61% of the national pig herd is
located).
3.1 Strategies of control and eradication
Stamping-out (culling): With an infectious disease like FMD affected animals can be a
source of infection to others. In such circumstances it may be economically and
technically expedient to slaughter the affected animals. In eradication campaigns,
infected or in-contact animals may be slaughtered to remove sources of infection
(Thrusfield, 1986:216). It is important to make the distinction between slaughter and
culling; both involve the destruction of animals: slaughtered animals are subsequently
processed for food whereas culled animals are disposed of. It is debateable as to whether
or not vaccinates would be accepted in the food chain for the Irish case and therefore it is
culling that will be examined in depth here.
Vaccination: Vaccines can confer immunity to many bacteria and viruses. They are
used routinely to prevent disease, and may be used during epidemics to decrease the
number of susceptible animals, thus assisting in terminating an epidemic (Thrusfield,
1986:216).
Both policies are supported by import controls, regular surveillance of the livestock
populations at risk, the provision of diagnostic laboratory facilities and, in the event of
disease, controls on the movement of livestock.
8 A broad overview is given here only; input parameter values used in the model will be outlined in a
forthcoming paper.10
3.1.2 Costs associated with control
As the control and eradication of FMD is clearly beneficial for Ireland, the relative costs
of alternative control strategies only need be examined here in a cost-effectiveness
framework. The relative costs of the alternative control strategies have to be identified
and measured. Direct costs of control measures are relatively easily identified and can be
equated with resource costs incurred by farmers and relevant public authorities.
Consequential costs, secondary in nature but not in importance are more difficult to
identify and measure since they concern society as a whole.
9 A further difficulty
associated with consequential costs (benefits) is the ‘transfer problem’; the possibility of
inadvertently double counting certain effects: a loss (gain) in one sector is not a loss
(gain) to society as a whole if offset by a gain (loss) in another sector (multiplier effects
for agriculture, tourism and retail).
10 Also some of the costs cannot be quantified, at least
in monetary terms. Benefits would include increased trade and the psychological well
being accompanying the decreased disease incidence.
Disease control campaigns incur a cost, it is important therefore to assess before they are
instituted both the costs arising from the disease itself and the cost associated with its
control. It is the possible to weigh the cost of the control campaign against the benefits
(e.g. increased production) that would accrue from control of the disease in order to
determine the economic viability of the campaign. Clearly, if the control campaign costs
more than the losses due to the disease then the campaign is not economically viable.
There are four potential cost elements in an FMD eradication programme:
The Direct costs of FMD eradication are relatively easily quantified as they can be
equated with certain resource expenditures incurred by producers of livestock and by
relevant government authorities.
(i) Eradication costs include cost of slaughter, compensation for
destroyed animals and materials, cleaning and disinfection (C and D)
of infected premises, and quarantine enforcement.
(ii) Production losses arise from lost production in depopulated premises
and industries linked to the livestock sector. Although FMD has a
very high mortality rate among young animals, it usually only reduces
milk and beef production in older animals. Physical losses arising
from stamping out and depopulation are included.
9 Indeed many consequential costs are by their nature non-measurable and can only be discussed
qualitatively.11
Indirect or consequential costs are more difficult to identify and measure since they
theoretically extend to all sectors of the economy:
(iii) Trade restrictions: Revenue foregone as a result of denied access to
markets. Access to markets (if any) may be restricted to lower price
markets (the international beef market is segmented into FMD-free
and FMD endemic markets with the price difference between the two
segments for meat of similar quality being as high as 50%).
(iv) Knock-on effects for the non-agricultural sector: e.g. downstream
effects for tourism and other sectors as a result of movement
restrictions etc. should prove important. Tourism was the big loser
during the 2001 outbreak.
Control and eradication costs will depend primarily on the scale and duration of the
outbreak. Expected losses are defined as the probability of an outbreak multiplied by the
estimated cost. Estimating the probability of an occurrence is difficult; however the rapid
spread of a pandemic strain of FMD in 2001 clearly demonstrates the ability of the virus
to infiltrate a wide geographical area. Factors crucial in determining the magnitude of the
economic impact include: trading partner reactions, rate of disease spread, containment,
eradication and multiplier effects.
In this research, the cost effectiveness of employing emergency vaccination as an adjunct
to the basic culling strategy in the event of an outbreak for a number of simulated
outbreaks Irish outbreaks is assessed using an epidemiological module to simulate the
disease dynamics, and an economic module to convert outbreak and control effects into
estimates of direct control costs and export losses.
11
Costs in the model are calculated as follows (taken from Hill and Reeves, 2006:86):
The total cost of destruction for each herd (unit) = (Appraisal cost + Cleaning and
disinfection cost) + [(Number of animals in the unit) × (Cost of euthanasia + Cost of
indemnification + Cost of disposal)]
The total cost of destruction for all herds = (Number of units destroyed) × (Appraisal cost
+ Cleaning and disinfection cost) + [(Total number of animals destroyed) × (Cost of
euthanasia + Cost of indemnification + Cost of disposal)]
Similarly there are both fixed and variable costs associated with vaccination; there is a
fixed cost associated with vaccination site set up and an additional cost per animal
vaccinated. A baseline vaccination cost applies to animals up to a certain threshold
(500,000 in this case) where after an additional cost applies. The total cost of vaccination
for all herds is calculated as follows (also taken from Hill and Reeves, 2006:86):
11 An analysis of indirect costs are contained in a forthcoming publication.12
If the threshold is not reached: [(Number of units vaccinated) × (Cost of site setup)]
+ [(Total number of animals vaccinated) × (Baseline cost per animal)]
If the threshold is reached: [(Number of units vaccinated) × (Cost of site setup)]
+ [(Threshold level) × (Baseline cost per animal)] + [(Total no. of animals vaccinated –
Threshold level) × (Baseline cost per animal + Additional cost per animal)]
3.2 Simulation scenarios
Two methods of control are modelled (both are in line with EU FMD legislation):
(1) SO: stamping-out of infected herds and dangerous contacts within a 3km radius and;
(2) SOEV: stamping-out of infected herds and dangerous contacts in conjunction with
emergency vaccination (and the subsequent slaughter) of animals within a 5km radius
i.e., herds are culled as above within a 3km radius, with herds for a further 2km
vaccinated and then subsequently slaughtered .
12
In adopting SOEV here it is assumed that vaccinates are to be slaughtered subsequently.
In the event of slaughtering these animals the ‘official’ length of time out of markets
remains at 3 months not 6 (if vaccinates were allowed enter the food chain). The benefit
of employing emergency vaccination in this case would be, it is hoped, to ‘close-in’ on
the disease more quickly and dampen down virus spread. As vaccinates are subsequently
slaughtered it would appear that SOEV will involve the culling of more animals (over a
larger area – given the radius). However, as emergency vaccination is to be used in an
effort to minimise the scale of an outbreak, it is hoped that there are in fact less infected
premises, dangerous contacts and thus casualties. This is the hypothesis to be tested by
the model in the analysis here.
3.2.1 Data
Herd data for cattle herds and sheep flocks are used (with pig census data used for the
analysis in Co. Cavan).
13 Data on cattle herds was obtained from animals that were TB
tested in 2005 (this test is obligatory for all cattle herds). There is no differentiation
between beef, dairy or suckler
14 herds. For sheep flocks, 2005 sheep census data are
used. Pig census data from 2001 is used; this is the most up-to-date source available.
The data was provided by the Department of Agriculture.
15 Each herd or flock has a
unique herd ID number and production type with each holding having a latitude/longitude
point. Knowledge of the exact geolocation of each herd ensures the dissemination of the
virus is modelled more accurately. In preparing for simulation, data was grouped on a
12 This can be anything up to 10km but it is envisaged here that it would occur 2km outside the 3km zone
initially. Other options have also been tested; the model is flexible in that regard.
13 Lat/Lon points not available for all so there are a small number of herds unaccounted for.
14 Cows other than those kept principally to produce milk for human consumption.
15 Herd census and flock data courtesy of CVERA (UCD), with a special thanks to Guy McGrath in this
regard.13
county-by-county basis. Herds (as opposed to animals) are the unit of concern in the
model.
An important issue in terms of an analysis using Irish herd data is the fragmentation of
farms - half of the farms in the State consist of two or more land parcels while almost
10% comprise four or more parcels (Lafferty et al., 1999:25). Difficulties arise as a
result when modelling on a herd-by-herd basis. As it is not unusual in the Irish case for
one farm to comprise four or five separate parcels of land the herd is not located at one
single point and the disease could be more widespread than anticipated (i.e., a multiple
point disease source). From the modelling point of view each of these points has the
same herd/farm ID number. The solution used in this analysis to deal with the problem is
to use the herd number with associated latitude and longitude points in decimal degrees
based on the centroid of the largest fragment of land used by the farmer, thus there is only
one record per farm. As a consequence, the model may underestimate the occurrence of
the disease. One initial hypothetical outbreak is assumed to occur at the centre point of
the region with one ‘latent’ herd.
3.2.2 The regions
A brief summary of the simulation results only are given for each region in this paper
(more detailed results are available from the corresponding author). For all simulations
the discussion of results is mainly focussed on the mean values however some reference
is also made to the distribution.
The four regions examined here are based on areas of differing farming types and herd
densities in various geographic locations within the country. See table 2 below:
Table 2: Regional information
Region Farming type/ County Area Total Animals Animal density
1 Marginal/Mixed:















3 Intensive fattening/mixed crops:

















3.3 Region 1: Galway, Roscommon – marginal/mixed farming
This region in the western province of Connaught can be
described as an area of mixed farming. The area of the two
counties combined is 869,856 hectares. The total number of
cattle in the region is 673,677 with an average herd size of 40.
Sheep in the region total 694,420 with an average herd size of
101. Herd density is high (157 animals per km
2). Information
relating to both counties is contained in table 2:
Fig. 2: Region 1: Galway/Roscommon
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Table 3: Region 1 – Galway, Roscommon
Galway Roscommon Total
Area (hectares) 615,052 254,804 869,856
Holdings 13,089 6,174 19,263
Sheep flocks 4,922 1,964 6,886
Total Sheep 496,883 197,537 694,420
Average flock size 101 101
Cattle herds 11,343 5,436 16,779
Total Cattle 458,451 215,226 673,677
Average herd size 40 40
Total herds/flocks 16,265 7,400 23,665
Total animals 955,334 412,763 1,368,097
Source: All Herd census and flock data courtesy of CVERA
57% of the land in Connaught is classified as ‘difficult’ for agriculture, i.e., stony and
infertile soils, steep slopes and rock outcrops. Moreover, small farm size and
fragmentation are particular issues in the west (Lafferty et al., 1999:13). Pasture is
particularly important in east Connaught with more upland areas used for rough grazing.
Sheep rearing is significant in east Galway, south Roscommon and in the western
mountain ranges (Lafferty et al., 1999:103). Mixed farming is particularly evident in the
lowlands of east Galway and south Roscommon (Lafferty et al., 1999:105).
The combined total of herds and animals in region 1 are 23,665 and 1.37m respectively.
16 All maps from www.asthmacare.ie/images/map.jpg15
3.3.1 Region 1 simulation results
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The overall mean values after 80 iterations conclude that stamping-out (SO) alone would
appear to be more cost-effective than carrying it out in conjunction with a campaign of
emergency vaccination (SOEV).
Adopting a campaign SO only, 499 units were culled on average (with a standard
deviation of 331 units, 131 at the 5
th percentile and 983 at the 95
th percentile). This
amounted to 17,377 animals destroyed on average over the course of the outbreak here.
Average outbreak length was found to be 63 days (with a standard deviation of 25 days,
34 at the 5
th percentile and 109 at the 95
th percentile). In terms of dissemination of the
virus -on average 23 units were infected by airborne spread, 25 by direct spread and 6 by
indirect spread. 18 units were destroyed on average because they were detected positive
(with a standard deviation of 11 units, 6 at the 5
th percentile and 33 at the 95
th percentile)
and 481 because they were in the destruction ring (standard deviation was found to be
321 herds with 126 at the 5
th percentile and 941 at the 95
th percentile). The total cost
associated with destruction came to € 21.8m on average (with a standard deviation of
€ 17.5m, € 5m at the 5
th percentile, and € 44.9m at the 95
th percentile).
On the other hand SOEV led to the destruction of 118 more herds with 617 units
destroyed on average (with a standard deviation of 369 units, 133 at the 5
th percentile and
1,240 at the 95
th percentile). This amounted to 2,401 more animals (19,778) on average.
Vaccination (and subsequent slaughter) was carried out on 235 holdings (standard
deviation of 339, 0 at the 5
th percentile and 958 at the 95
th percentile) with 10,318
animals vaccinated on average over the course of an outbreak. In terms of disease
dissemination; 20 units were infected by airborne spread, 28 by direct spread and 5 by
indirect spread, on average. 22 units were destroyed because they were detected positive
(with a standard deviation of 22 units also, 3 at the 5
th percentile and 65 at the 95
th
percentile) and 595 (352 standard deviation, 131 at the 5
th percentile and 1,194 at the 95
th
percentile) because they were in the destruction ring. The average outbreak length was
found to be twelve days less at 51 days (with a standard deviation of 17 days, 32 at the 5
th
percentile and 78 at the 95
th percentile), but overall destruction and vaccination costs
came in at approximately € 5m higher on average, at € 26.6m, this was made up of
destruction costs totalling € 26.4m and vaccination costs of € 153,986. Total costs were
found to be € 5.1m at the 5
th percentile and € 58.1m at the 95
th percentile with a standard
deviation of € 18.4m.
In this high-density region then a campaign of SO alone would appear to be more cost-
effective (in terms of control) however, the strategic use of emergency vaccination does
shorten the duration of the outbreak.
17 For space reasons, only a summary of the results is provided for each region. See Dillon (2007) for more
details.16
3.4 Region 2: Co. Cork –a dairying region





Average flock size 40
Cattle herds 6,085
Total Cattle 318,115
Average herd size 52
Total herds/flocks 6,752
Total animals 344,667
This region in the south of the country can be described as a dairy intensive region. It is
the country’s largest county at 750,758 hectares. The total number of cattle in the region
is 318,115 with an average herd size of 52. This is a region of a much lower herd density
(46 animals per km
2).
This region enjoys very favourable climatic and soil conditions for dairying based on a
long growing season with low costs of housing and winter-feeding. Dairying has become
a more specialised type of farming – by 1991 approximately 93% of all dairy cows were
enumerated on 42,000 specialist farms. The south-west dairying region includes north
and east Kerry, almost all of Cork, Limerick and substantial parts of Tipperary,
Waterford and Kilkenny as well as south-west Clare (Lafferty et al., 1999:82).
The combined total of herds and animals in the region are 6,750 herds and 344,667
respectively. A brief summary of the findings is contained below.
3.4.1 Region 2 simulation results
The overall mean values after 80 iterations conclude that stamping-out in conjunction
with emergency vaccination (SOEV) would appear to be more cost-effective than
stamping-out alone (SO) in this case.
Adopting a campaign of SO only, 967 units were destroyed (with a standard deviation of
597 units, 219 at the 5
th percentile and 1,982 at the 95
th percentile). This amounted to the
destruction of 39,108 animals on average over the course of the outbreak. Average
outbreak length was 63 days (with a standard deviation of 25, 28 at the 5
th percentile and
103 at the 95
th percentile). In terms of dissemination of the virus - 22 units were infected
by airborne spread, 33 by direct spread and 7 by indirect spread on average. 38 units
were destroyed on average because they were detected positive (with a standard deviation
of 38, 2 at the 5
th percentile and 96 at the 95
th percentile) and 930 on average because
they were in the destruction ring (standard deviation 563, 216 at the 5
th percentile and
1,909 at the 95





(with a standard deviation of € 38.9m, € 14.2m at the 5
th percentile and € 126.2m at the 95
th
percentile).
On the other hand SOEV resulted in the destruction on average of 224 less herds at 743
units (with a standard deviation of 461, 127 at the 5
th percentile and 1,434 at the 95
th
percentile) and 9,394 less animals (29,714) on average. Vaccination (and subsequent
slaughter) was carried out on average on 349 holdings (with a standard deviation of 456
units, 0 at the 5
th percentile and 1,129 at the 95
th percentile) with 14,134 animals
vaccinated. On average 15 units were infected by airborne spread, 28 by direct spread
and by 5 indirect spread. 27 units were destroyed because they were detected positive
and 716 because they were in the destruction ring. The average outbreak length was
found to be 9 days less at 54 days (with a standard deviation of 21 days, 19 at the 5
th
percentile, 82 at the 95
th percentile) with an overall saving on average on destruction and
vaccination costs of € 14m with total control costs amounting to € 46.9m (standard
deviation € 30.2m, € 7.6m at the 5
th percentile, € 90.9m at the 95
th percentile). The average
total cost was made up of € 46.7m for destruction and € 0.227m for vaccination.
In this low-density region then a campaign of SOEV would appear to be more cost-
effective (in terms of control) than one of SO alone.
3.5 Region 3: Laois/Offaly – intensive
fattening/mixed crops
This region in the midlands is important in the
context of a national outbreak given the
implications for disease spread. The combined
area of these two counties is 370,927 hectares.
Herd density can be described as high (162
animals per km
2).
Table 5: Region 3 – Laois and Offaly
Laois Offaly Total
Area (hectares) 171,946 198,981 370,927
Holdings 3,272 3,397 6,669
Sheep flocks 523 733 1,256
Total Sheep 65,638 99,901 165,539
Average flock size 126 136
Cattle herds 2,635 2,785 5,420
Total Cattle 222,135 212,441 434,576
Average herd size 84 76
Total herds/flocks 3,158 3,518 6,676
Total animals 287,773 312,342 600,115
Fig.5.3:Region3- CountiesLaoisandOffaly
Fig. 4:Region3- CountiesLaoisandOffaly18
The combined total of holdings and animals in the region are 6,669 and 599,716
respectively.
3.5.1 Region 3 simulation results
The overall mean values after 80 iterations conclude that stamping-out in conjunction
with emergency vaccination (SOEV) would appear to be more cost-effective than
stamping-out alone (SO) in this case.
Adopting a campaign SO only, 406 units were on average, destroyed over the course of
the outbreak (with a standard deviation of 206, 115 at the 5
th percentile and 767 at the
95
th percentile). This on average led to the destruction of 40,980 animals. Average
outbreak length was found to be 45 days (with a standard deviation of 13 days, 23 at the
5
th percentile and 66 at the 95
th percentile). In terms of dissemination of the virus – on
average 11 units were infected by airborne spread, 34 by direct spread and 5 by indirect
spread. 17 units were destroyed on average because they were detected positive
(standard deviation 13, 3 at the 5
th percentile and 44 at the 95
th percentile) and 389
because they were in the destruction ring (standard deviation 195, 112 at the 5
th percentile
and 747 at the 95
th percentile). The total cost associated with destruction came to € 39.6m
on average (with a standard deviation of € 19.6m, € 11.3m at the 5
th percentile and € 72.5m
at the 95
th percentile).
On the other hand SOEV resulted, on average, in the destruction of 27 fewer herds, at
379 units (standard deviation 172, 145 at the 5
th percentile and 668 at the 95
th percentile)
and 2,719 less animals (38,261). Vaccination (and subsequent slaughter) was carried out
on 82 holdings on average over the course of the outbreak (with a standard deviation of
146, 0 at the 5
th percentile and 391 at the 95
th percentile) with 8,098 animals vaccinated.
On average, 10 units were infected by airborne spread, 31 by direct spread and by 5
indirect spread. 15 units were destroyed because they were detected positive and 364
because they were in the destruction ring. The average outbreak length was found to be
the same at 45 days (with a standard deviation of 12 days, 26 at the 5
th percentile and 68
at the 95
th percentile) with an overall saving on destruction and vaccination costs on
average of € 2.63m with total control costs amounting to € 36.97m (standard deviation of
€ 16.4m, € 14.8m at the 5
th percentile and € 64.9m at the 95
th percentile). On average
€ 36.9m of this was associated with destruction and € 58,000 with vaccination.
In this high-density region (unlike the previous high-density one) then a campaign of
SOEV would appear to be more cost-effective (in terms of control) than one of SO alone.
There was no difference in the duration of the outbreak19
3.6 Region 4: Cavan
This county bordering the North covers an area of
193,188 hectares. As pigs are important in the
dissemination of FMD virus, analysing the impact
of an outbreak in this region both with and without
pigs is important. 156 pig herds are taken in to
account in the second analysis. Again the area can
be described as being of a fairly high herd density
(150 animals per km
2).
Pig production has become highly
specialised and dominated by a
small number of very large
producers. In 1973 the average size
of a herd was 29 animals, by 1983
this had increased to 114 and by
1997 it was 846, indicating the
‘industrialisation’ associated with pig production (Lafferty et al., 1999:110). Of the
1,167 pig herds in the country 15% of these are in Co. Cavan; this numbers 780,225 pigs
(61% of the country total).
3.6.1 Region 4 –Cavan (without pigs) simulation results
The combined total of holdings and animals in the region are 5,207 holdings and 289,123
respectively. The overall mean values after 80 iterations conclude that stamping-out
alone (SO) would appear to be more cost-effective than stamping-out in conjunction with
emergency-vaccination (SOEV) in this case.
Adopting a campaign SO only led to, on average, the destruction of 891 units (with a
standard deviation of 568 units, 180 at the 5
th percentile and 1,943 at the 95
th percentile).
This totalled 46,155 animals on average over the course of the outbreak. Average
outbreak length was found to be 66 days (with a standard deviation of 25 days, 31 at the
5
th percentile and 109 at the 95
th percentile). In terms of dissemination of the virus – on
average, 32 units were infected by airborne spread, 38 by direct spread and 8 by indirect
spread. 45 units were destroyed because they were detected positive on average
(standard deviation 49, 5 at the 5
th percentile and 141 at the 95
th percentile) and 846
because they were in the destruction ring (standard deviation 522, 175 at the 5
th percentile
and 1,806 at the 95
th percentile). The total cost associated with destruction came to € 64m
on average (with a standard deviation of € 40.7m, € 13m at the 5
th percentile and € 137.9m
at the 95
th percentile).





Average flock size 71
Cattle herds 4,765
Total Cattle 242,284
Average herd size 51
Total herds/flocks 5,554
Total animals 289,123
Fig. 5: Region 4 – County Cavan20
On the other hand SOEV resulted in the destruction of 372 more herds on average at
1,263 (with a standard deviation of 704, 361 at the 5
th percentile and 2,912 at the 95
th
percentile) and 18,750 more animals on average at 64,905. Vaccination (and subsequent
slaughter) was carried out on 733 holdings (standard deviation 758, 0 at the 5
th percentile
and 2,487 at the 95
th percentile) with 37,819 animals vaccinated on average. 25 units
were infected by airborne spread, 28 by direct spread and 6 by indirect spread. 40 units
were destroyed on average because they were detected positive (standard deviation 42, 4
at the 5
th percentile and 141 at the 95
th percentile) and 1,222 because they were in the
destruction ring. The average outbreak length was found to be longer at 74 days (with a
standard deviation of 30 days, 37 at the 5
th percentile and 142 at the 95
th percentile). This
option proved more costly with an overall increase on destruction and vaccination costs
of € 27m, with total control costs amounting to € 91.4m on average (with a standard
deviation of € 51m, € 26.7m at the 5
th percentile and € 209.1m at the 95
th percentile).
€ 90.9m corresponded, on average to destruction costs and € 487,123 to vaccination.
In this high-density region then as in region 1 a campaign of SO would appear to be
more cost-effective (in terms of control) than that of SOEV. The employment of
emergency vaccination in this case did not as the theory would suggest shorten the
duration of the outbreak. It should be pointed out that the vaccination costs are
relatively small (when compared to those of destruction) however its employment does
not have the desired effect of closing-in on the disease as perhaps expected.
3.6.2 Region 4 –Cavan (with pigs) simulation results
The addition of 175 pig herds (780,225 animals) brings the combined total of holdings
and animals in the region to 5,382 and 1,069,348 respectively. The overall mean values
after 80 iterations conclude that SO would again appear to be more cost-effective in this
region even when pigs are added in to the animal population.
In adopting a campaign of SO only, 1,986 units on average were destroyed (standard
deviation 1,262, 209 at the 5
th percentile and 4,104 at the 95
th percentile). This involved
the destruction of 353,847 animals over the course of the outbreak. Average outbreak
length was 100 days (with a standard deviation of 50 days, 28 at the 5
th percentile and
185 at the 95
th percentile). In terms of dissemination of the virus - on average 77 units
were infected by airborne spread, 63 by direct spread and 36 by indirect spread. 133
units were destroyed because they were detected positive (standard deviation 130, 4 at the
5
th percentile and 381 at the 95
th percentile) and 1,852 (standard deviation 1,142, 206 at
the 5
th percentile and 3,739 at the 95
th percentile) because they were in the destruction
ring. The total cost associated with destruction came to € 188m on average (standard
deviation € 139m, € 16.5m at the 5
th percentile and € 440m at the 95
th percentile).
On the other hand SOEV resulted in the destruction of 262 more herds (2,248) with a
standard deviation of 1,315 (401 at the 5
th percentile and 4,224 at the 95
th percentile).
This involved the destruction of 49,004 more animals (402,851) on average. Vaccination
(and subsequent slaughter) was carried out on 1,605 holdings (standard deviation 1,343, 021
at the 5
th percentile and 3,663 at the 95
th percentile) with 84,203 animals vaccinated. In
terms of dissemination of virus; 49 units were infected by airborne spread, 47 by direct
spread and 26 by indirect spread. 94 units were destroyed on average, because they were
detected positive (standard deviation 96, 3 at the 5
th percentile and 271 at the 95
th
percentile) with 2,154 units culled because they were in the destruction ring. The average
outbreak length was found to be seven days longer at 107 days (standard deviation 55, 28
at the 5
th percentile and 190 at the 95
th percentile). Destruction and vaccination costs
were found to be € 27m higher at € 215 (with a standard deviation of € 149.8m, € 30.8m at
the 5
th percentile and € 453.6m at the 95
th percentile). Of this € 214m related to
destruction costs and € 1m to vaccination.
Again SO was found to be the more cost-effective control option when pigs are taken into
account.
3.7 Discussion of results
This section seeks to draw general conclusions from the simulation results. It would
appear from this analysis that a policy of SOEV is most appropriate for use in the event
of an outbreak in the low-density region 2 (Cork), when direct costs only are taken into
account. An overall cost-saving of € 14m and a reduction in the duration of the outbreak
of on average of nine days is made here. Although the strategic use of vaccination in the
high-density region 1 (Galway, Roscommon) also led to an overall reduction in the
duration of the outbreak of twelve days, the total (direct) costs of control associated with
vaccination and destruction in this case were found to be € 5m higher when this policy
was adopted. A relevant question in both of these cases is whether the subsequent trade
and general economy-wide implications of using emergency vaccination add further to
the costs or does the shortening of the outbreak lead to a quicker re-opening of markets
and lower economy-wide costs? As in this case vaccinates are subsequently slaughtered
there are no additional penalties in terms of officially getting back in to markets when
vaccination is used but as costs are found to be higher when vaccination is employed in
region 1 and lower in region 2 therefore stamping-out alone is the preferred option in the
former and stamping-out in conjunction with emergency vaccination in the latter. While
the strategic use of emergency vaccination should in theory help to dampen an outbreak
and thus lessen its magnitude, this does not seem to be the case in region 1. Because a
larger radius (around all IP’s and DCP’s) is taken into account when modelling the use of
emergency vaccination, it is not surprising that more are culled in this high-density area;
however the hypothesis that vaccination would lead to fewer occurrences of the disease
and hence less destruction does not seem to be the case, with the destruction of, on
average 118 more herds.
In region 3 (Laois, Offaly), another high herd density region the average length of
outbreak was found to be 45 days in both cases. However, a cost-saving of € 2.63m was
made when SOEV was applied. 27 fewer herds were destroyed when SOEV was applied.
In this high-density region (unlike the previous high-density one), a campaign of SOEV
would appear to be more cost-effective (in terms of control) than one of SO alone. There22
was no difference in the duration of the outbreak here. As to why SOEV was found to be
marginally more suitable in this high-density region as opposed to the previous one; a
point to note here is that there are relatively fewer sheep than cattle in this region
(165,539 as compared to 434,576) than in region 1 (694,420 sheep, 673,677 cattle) and
perhaps this has some implications in terms of disease spread (with clinical signs being
generally more noticeable at an earlier stage with cattle).
In the final high-density region (Region 4 – Cavan) SO was again found to be the more
cost-effective option both with and without the pig population being taken into account.
The very high costs associated with slaughter when pigs are added should be noted –
around 20% of herds were slaughtered in this case. Cost-savings of € 27m were made in
both the ‘without pigs’ and ‘with pigs’ scenarios when SO was used. Before taking pigs
into account in comparing SO and SOEV, 374 more herds were destroyed when SOEV
was adopted and the outbreak was found to increase by eight days (up from 66 days with
SO only to 74 days with SOEV). Costs were found to increase from € 64m to € 91m
respectively. With pigs, 262 more herds were destroyed when SOEV was applied and the
average length of outbreak was found to be seven days longer at 107 days. Control costs
were found to be € 188m and € 215m when SO and SOEV were compared when pigs were
taken into account.
4. Conclusion
In terms of a general conclusion, holding constant all modelling parameters, stamping-out
alone was found to be more cost-effective in two out of the three high-density regions
examined here and stamping-out in conjunction with emergency vaccination was
preferred otherwise. Overall, this underlines the fact that there is no common ‘best’
policy in terms of FMD control in the face of an outbreak – differences across regions in
terms of area size and structural differences in the composition of herds indicate that any
decision taken in determining the most appropriate control strategy must be taken at a
regional level. It should be noted that direct costs (of control) only have been taken into
account in this analysis and exploring and the indirect economic effects of adopting either
strategy may point to a different overall conclusion.
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Appendix A
Criteria for the decision to apply protective vaccination* (Annex X)
Criteria Decision
For vaccination Against vaccination
Population density of susceptible
animals
High Low
Predominant species clinically affected Pigs Ruminants
Movement of potentially infected
animals or products out of the
protection zone
Evidence No evidence
Predicted airborne spread of virus from
infected holdings
High Low or absent
Suitable vaccine Available Not available
Origin of outbreaks (tractability) Unknown Known




Distribution of outbreaks Widespread Restricted
Public reaction to total stamping out
policy
Strong Weak
Acceptance of regionalisation after
vaccination
Yes No
* = In accordance with the report of the Scientific Committee on Animal Health 199925
Additional criteria for the decision to introduce emergency vaccination
Criteria Decision













economic losses in the
agricultural and non
agricultural sectors





economic losses in the
agricultural and non
agricultural sectors
It is foreseeable that the
24/48 hours rule cannot be
implemented effectively












(1) 24/48 hours rule means: (a) Infected herds on holdings referred to in Article 10 cannot be stamped out
within 24 hours after the confirmation of the disease, and (b) The pre-emptive killing of animals likely to
be infected or contaminated cannot be safely carried out within less than 48 hours.